In November, President Volodymyr Zelensky introduced Ukraine’s Resilience Plan — a list of changes designed to strengthen the state from within. A month earlier, the president had handed over to allies a Victory Plan, consisting of five points and three confidential annexes, aimed at turning the tide of the war with Russia in Ukraine’s favor. Readers have already seen numerous discussions on both plans in the media and social networks.
However, we are certain: no matter how the “external or internal” victory plan of Zelensky may be, today there is no strong Minister of Defense in the president’s team who is capable of implementing it.
Over two months ago, we published the article “The Ministry of Chaos Under Umierov.” Its summary is simple: after a year in office, Minister Umierov has achieved real results mainly in procurement and digitalization. But these changes largely happened not because of him, but despite him.
In the article, we clearly outlined which areas within the Ministry of Defense require urgent repairs and suggested specific management steps to fix the most important processes. These include the “chaotic” system of management at the Ministry of Defense, international cooperation, and defense procurement.
Without success in these three areas, any of Zelensky’s plans will fail. After all, for the priorities of “Front” and “Weapons,” Zelensky needs a Ministry of Defense with clear management, capable of directing the General Staff, taking responsibility, and saying “no” to anyone when necessary. Without strong military diplomacy, we will not see Western weapons, and local production will not survive without international investment, controlled exports, and access to Western defense technologies. In our view, none of these problems have been solved by the minister.
Below, we attempt to explain in detail how chaos within the ministry is gradually turning into sabotage and transforming Umierov’s department into a “Ministry of Defeat.”
Has Umierov improved procurement? No.
First, there was a public and clumsy attempt to remove the head of the Defense Procurement Agency (DPA), Marina Bezrukova, who is known outside of Ukraine for her efficiency and integrity. To do so, Umierov’s long-time ally and deputy in charge of procurement, Dmitro Klimenko, proposed to dissolve the DPA by absorbing it into the much smaller State Rear Operator (SRO). This task was given to him by the minister. Both Klimenko and Umierov justified this move by citing “NATO standards,” which turned out to be false, and NATO’s representation had to publicly deny it. Only under pressure from public experts and international partners did the minister back off from the idea of dissolving the DPA and submit candidates for the agency’s supervisory board, which were approved by the government on October 11. However, the supervisory board has yet to begin working.
As of the end of November, the supervisory board is non-functional and cannot play its role as a safeguard against the political dismissal of the DPA head. Contracts with board members are being delayed due to documentary formalities. As a result, the board cannot enter into a contract with the current head of the DPA, and her dismissal could be carried out with a single decision from the Minister of Defense.
Second, special exporters have not been liquidated. Following a high-profile investigation into corruption in the work of one of the special exporters, “Spetstechnoexport,” Umierov announced plans to transfer the company from the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) to the Ministry of Defense and to eventually liquidate it.
Recall that it is through “Spetstechnoexport” and two other companies, “Ukrspecexport” and “Progress,” that weapons are often supplied at inflated prices, through dubious intermediaries, or shipments are delayed despite significant prepayments.
The liquidation of special exporters (removal of their import functions) is a real NATO requirement, and Ukraine must fulfill it without waiting for the end of martial law. However, two months after the announcement, there has been no information from the Minister of Defense or his deputies on the results of the cleanup. As a result, we suspect that Ukraine is still receiving more expensive weapons in smaller quantities.
Third, the procurement function in the Ministry remains split and scattered, and the semi-transparent funding scheme for developments remains unchanged.
The most scandalous department of the Ministry of Defense — the Department of Military-Technical Policy (DMTP) — continues to operate. The DMTP still handles all arms contracts signed before the creation of the DPA and retains a monopoly on the procurement of defense innovations through the outdated Soviet procedure of “research and development work.” The total value of these contracts exceeds 410 billion UAH as of early 2024.
The notorious department’s leadership still includes Toomas Nakhur, who is suspected of embezzling 1.5 billion UAH on mortar shell procurements. Many employees who serviced the scandalous contracts also remain in their positions. The DMTP has not been audited by the Accounting Chamber or the Ministry of Defense’s Main Inspection.
Today, the DMTP essentially duplicates the newly created Department of Procurement Policies (DPP). Both departments are involved in prioritizing the list of weapons that need to be procured at the General Staff’s request. What motivates both departments and others involved in “prioritization” remains a mystery.
This is overseen by Deputy Minister Dmitro Klimenko, who is so indispensable (or obliging) that in addition to overseeing defense procurement with a total budget of over 800 billion UAH, Umierov has also entrusted him with several new “money” areas with high corruption risks. These include three Ministry departments: capital investments (military housing construction), defense land, and Ministry funds (training grounds, partial fortification construction, etc.), as well as corporate management (around 100 state enterprises under the Ministry’s jurisdiction, including “Motor Sich” and “Ukrnafta”). Thus, Klimenko is in charge of four complex, “money-heavy” and risky areas within the Ministry, and he is a close friend and former business partner of the Minister.
The problem of chaotic and unsystematic management remains unresolved by the Minister and has become a new culture.
The Ministry of Defense, despite having full resources, support from the government, parliament, civil society, and international donors, operates “on crutches” because the minister does not dive deep enough, does not analyze, and does not personally manage.
Umierov does not hide this and calls this style “delegating responsibility.”
This kind of “delegation” has already led to the Ministry of Defense recalling at least 100,000 domestically produced mines from the front. The reason — poor quality. The department overseeing this is directly under the Minister of Defense, the so-called military representatives (voenpredy). As journalists discovered, these military representatives turned a blind eye to the obvious inability of a domestic factory to produce large volumes of quality shells and, despite this, recommended signing a contract with it. All reports from military representatives were put on the Minister’s desk. Only when the mines began to explode on the internet and social networks, rather than at the front, did Umierov’s ministry begin to respond.
“Weapons” is the third point of the President’s Resilience Plan. It involves ramping up domestic production of artillery shells, rockets, and drones in cooperation with partners. The ability of the current Minister of Defense to implement this point is evident in practice — during the most critical period of the war, the military faces a shortage of mortar shells.
“Delegating responsibility” creates a greenhouse environment for sabotaging any changes: various departments in the ministry can duplicate each other’s functions, deputy ministers can oversee numerous “money-heavy” areas, and advisors and assistants to the Minister are allowed to command the deputies themselves.
Indeed, two long-time friends and business partners of Umierov, Snaver Seytkhaliev (a former deputy of Oleksiy Reznikov in the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories) and Lenur Mambetov, are allowed to give orders on behalf of the Minister of Defense. Both are formally registered as non-staff advisors to the State Secretary on a voluntary basis, even though the Ministry has not had a State Secretary since October and is now led by an acting official.
Umierov, Mambetov, and Seytkhaliev began their careers together in the 2000s at “Astelit,” which later became “LifeCell” — a joint venture between Rinat Akhmetov’s company and Turkish mobile operator Turkcell.
Despite having no formal positions in the Ministry of Defense and therefore no access to state secrets, no obligation to file electronic declarations, or undergo special screening, these advisors are often present at important meetings within the Ministry and, accordingly, may have access to sensitive information.
According to unofficial sources, which investigative journalists widely use for obtaining information about Russian citizens, Seytkhaliev and Mambetov hold Russian passports. Our records from business registers across the US, Turkey, Ukraine, Panama, Russia, Kyrgyzstan, South Africa, Estonia, Tunisia, Canada, and other countries confirm (see documents) that Seytkhaliev, Mambetov, and Umierov have been reliable business partners in structures related to Turkish investments and influence in Ukraine for nearly two decades.
It is no surprise why Seytkhaliev and Mambetov, on behalf of the Ministry of Defense, participate in numerous official visits to Turkey. Umierov himself, as Minister of Defense, has visited Turkey at least three times on official visits, while his first visit to Denmark, which provides us with the most aid in proportion to GDP for weapons, only occurred in November 2024.
The Ministry of Defense is turning into a “Turkish court.” This is a cause for concern for our key ally — the United States, who are particularly concerned about the protection of their defense technologies. The potential access of Seytkhaliev and Mambetov to sensitive information in the Ministry of Defense and the pro-Turkey leanings
