On the eve of February 24, 2022, Ukraine’s media landscape resembled a battlefield where old oligarchic empires fought fiercely for influence, while President Zelenskyy’s team desperately tried to seize control of the narrative. Television still set the rules, Telegram was just gaining momentum, and labels like “Soros kids” and “pro-Russian” flew in both directions. But the full-scale war with Russia dramatically changed everything — and saved Zelenskyy from an internal political collapse.

Oligarchic Media Empires: Who Controlled What Before the Invasion

• Rinat Akhmetov — the undisputed king of media. His Media Group Ukraine (channels Ukraine, Ukraine 24, Futbol 1/2/3, the site Segodnya, regional outlets, and a pool of loyal opinion makers) was considered the most powerful force in the country. Ratings were record-breaking, influence even more so. But starting in 2021, Akhmetov entered open war with Bankova Street. The so-called “anti-oligarch law,” pressure on business, accusations of plotting a coup (Zelenskyy personally called Akhmetov the organizer of a putsch) — all this escalated into a total media assault. The “Respected One’s” channels tore apart Servant of the People, Yermak, and Zelenskyy daily. It seemed only a matter of time before a situational alliance of Akhmetov + Avakov + Poroshenko + media artillery would crush the Zelenskyy team in the information war. The war with Russia halted this scenario mid-sentence.
• Ihor Kolomoisky — the cunning player. 1+1 remained loyal to Zelenskyy (entertainment content + soft support), but his online resources and loyal influencers hit the “Soros kids” hard and without compromise. This gave the president room to maneuver: he could balance between the “Soros kids” and his own oligarchic allies without losing agency.
• Viktor Pinchuk — neutral-loyal. STB, ICTV, Novyi Kanal, and associated influencers kept their distance from harsh criticism of the authorities. They avoided trench warfare but were not fully pocket media for the Zelenskyy team.
• Dmytro Firtash — a “relic of the past.” Inter, K1, NTN already looked like ghosts from the 2010s — dormant and low-impact.
• Viktor Medvedchuk — after the raid on his TV channels in February 2021, he shifted to digital guerrilla warfare. Social networks, online media, influencers — criticism of Zelenskyy intensified, but it was largely a simulacrum. These resources did not so much promote pro-Russian narratives or alternative positions to the “Soros mainstream” as they laundered money and created the right picture for various secret deals.

What the Zelenskyy Team Had (and Didn’t Have)

By late 2021 – early 2022, Bankova lacked its own powerful media group. The old “Ze-networks” from the 2019 campaign had been abandoned financially and lived their own lives. Loyal outlets (Sadovyi’s resources, Gordon, Brodsky) maintained their own agency and did not become blind mouthpieces. Zelenskyy actively worked on building his own media holding — but the war accelerated and radicalized everything.

Telegram and “Independents” — a New Force Still Not in Charge

By late 2021 – early 2022, Telegram channels already played a noticeable role. Many apolitical bloggers and influencers earned on entertainment content, with a significant portion of income for Russian-speaking ones coming from the Russian audience. This was a segment not yet controlled by oligarchs, “Soros kids,” or Bankova — and it became one of the main beneficiaries of the war.

Conclusion: The War as a Lifeline for Zelenskyy

The full-scale Russian invasion effectively froze the internal oligarchic war. The Akhmetov–Zelenskyy conflict, heading toward a climax, was put on hold. Ukraine and other channels joined the unified telethon, Akhmetov later exited the media business (handing over licenses to the state in summer 2022), and Bankova gained near-monopoly control over the main television narrative.

This does not mean the media field became “healthy.” It simply became different: more centralized, less pluralistic, dominated by the official voice. But it was the war that saved Zelenskyy from a scenario where oligarchic media could have destroyed him in the eyes of society even before the first explosions.

To be continued — in Part 3: how everything changed after February 24: the unified telethon, the Telegram revolution, the disappearance of oligarchic TV, and the new reality of the information front.